Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation
Résumé
We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information (insider-executives) granted incentivizing executive stock options (ESO). We show that while insider-executives optimize their wealth, using their insider information nullies ESO incentives, misaligning their and shareholders' interests. We oer realigning methods: granting insider-executives reload stock options (RSO) and imposing blackout trading periods (blackouts). Eective blackouts keep insider-executives incentivized without being overly restrictive, i.e., without reducing their welfare below that of outsiders. We introduce RSO pricing for insider-executives and oer policy implications: reestablishing the currently out-of-favor RSO, and allowing rms, not regulators, to set blackout periods on securities they issue.
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