Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation - Université Toulouse 3 Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2023

Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation

David B Colwell
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1259135
David Feldman
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1259136
Wei Hu
  • Fonction : Auteur
  • PersonId : 1259137

Résumé

We introduce a theoretical model of executives with insider information (insider-executives) granted incentivizing executive stock options (ESO). We show that while insider-executives optimize their wealth, using their insider information nullies ESO incentives, misaligning their and shareholders' interests. We oer realigning methods: granting insider-executives reload stock options (RSO) and imposing blackout trading periods (blackouts). Eective blackouts keep insider-executives incentivized without being overly restrictive, i.e., without reducing their welfare below that of outsiders. We introduce RSO pricing for insider-executives and oer policy implications: reestablishing the currently out-of-favor RSO, and allowing rms, not regulators, to set blackout periods on securities they issue.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
IITRSOIR23.04.22.pdf (2.35 Mo) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-04116818 , version 1 (05-06-2023)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-04116818 , version 1

Citer

David B Colwell, David Feldman, Wei Hu, Monique Pontier. Information, Insider Trading, Executive Reload Stock Options, Incentives, and Regulation. 2023. ⟨hal-04116818⟩
21 Consultations
32 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More